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I'd like to thank Jon Macey and the Cornell Law School and
Law Review for organizing an interesting conference. I will keep my
comment brief for two reasons: it's late in the day and I do not have
many points of deep disagreement with David Haddock's paper.
Let me say at the outset that I agree with Dave's fundamental
point-that the Brady Report on the October 1987 market crash is
best understood as a political document, rather than as a policy pre-
scription grounded in positive economic research. I also found the
Report quite disappointing, because the Report's explicit objective
is not to understand the economic reasons for the crash but to study
"market mechanisms," to locate a cause for the rapid rate of the
market decline, and correspondingly propose improvements to
those mechanisms. Since I find it hard to understand how institu-
tions can be sensibly reformed to "prevent" another October 19
without identifying the fundamental economic cause(s) of the crash,
I found Dave's public choice perspective on the Report particularly
insightful. It offers a plausible explanation for an otherwise ill-de-
fined endeavor. My comment consists of relatively minor criticisms
of points Dave makes in his analysis of two of the political explana-
tions of the Report: the public interest and special interest group
perspectives. I then question more generally the third explanation
Dave offers, the rent extraction thesis, which I do not find
persuasive.
(1) Public Interest Perspective. In order to point out the difficulty
in viewing the Report as furthering the public interest, Dave takes
specific problems identified by the Brady Report and suggests pri-
vate, market solutions with greater welfare-enhancing qualities than
the regulatory solutions advanced by the Report. In one instance,
however, Dave's market-oriented alternative does not mesh with the
Report's proposal. This is the proposal of uniform margin require-
ments, directed at raising the margin requirements on futures and
options, which are set by the exchanges and are lower than the mar-
gin requirements for stock, which are set by the Fed. Dave suggests
that, rather than have a government agency set margin levels at a
t Professor of Law, Yale Law School and Yale School of Organization and
Management.
865
HeinOnline -- 74 Cornell L. Rev. 865 1988-1989
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
uniform rate for all exchanges, firms issuing securities should be re-
quired to approve the cross-listing of those securities on other ex-
changes, and their ability to delist should be expanded. The
rationale for this change is that firms are expected to desire stricter
margin requirements than self-interested market professionals, who
are viewed as the advocates of low futures margins. The idea is that,
because firms have the proper incentives to choose the optimal mar-
gin rate for their securities, their choice of exchange will depend on
its margin level, thereby making competing exchanges adjust their
margins upward.
I do not understand why a move to firm approval on cross-list-
ing is relevant to the objective of the Report's proposal. The mar-
gin requirements that it seeks to unify are the lower levels that apply
to index options and futures, derivative securities. These securities
are not issued by the corporations whose stocks comprise the under-
lying index. I therefore do not see how firms can affect the setting
of margin requirements on the CME or CBOE by a cross-listing ap-
proval rule. Is the proposal that firms must approve the writing by
third parties of options on their securities, or more particularly, op-
tions on indexes in which their securities happen to be included?
Or that firms must agree to the inclusion of their securities in an
index, in case that index will be the object of a futures or option
contract? If that is what Dave is driving at, the proposal does not
seem to me to be sensible. The incentives of firms need not be opti-
mizing in this case because the security of interest to issuers is not
the one being traded. Of course, to the extent that an active deriva-
tive market increases the value of the underlying securities because
investors desire the liquidity and hedging capacity it provides, it is
possible that firms' interests will not differ from that of the market-
professionals who want low margin requirements. This outcome
would presumably be satisfactory to-if not anticipated by-Dave,
but not to the Brady Task Force.
(2) Special Interest Perspective. Dave maintains that illogic and
complexity are prerequisites for a special interest group's legislative
success. While these may be sufficient conditions for such legisla-
tion, neither condition, in my opinion, is as necessary as his discus-
sion suggests. We can easily locate examples of special interest
legislation that are not particularly complex and abstruse, such as
rivers and harbors bills, agricultural price supports, or the failure to
close a military base. There is nothing that complex in these exam-
ples, just the standard Mancur Olson condition of concentrated
benefits and diffuse costs. In addition, recourse to illogical reason-
ing is unlikely always to be the key to success in the securi-
ties/financial markets context, because there can be concentrated
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interests on both sides of regulatory issues. The interests of groups
with equal degrees of expertise and knowledge may conflict-the
interests of institutional investors and investment banks, as well as
issuers, may conflict with those of other market professionals, such
as specialists and market makers. Correspondingly, illogical and
complex arguments or proposals will not necessarily thwart opposi-
tion to a proposal in this context.
Along this line, the Brady Report may not further the interest of
the industry as a whole as Dave suggests, but rather, the interest of
one particular sub-group. At least one of the Report's proposals,
the unification of margin requirements, is consistent with such a sce-
nario. Dave's explanation, that the uniform margin requirement
eliminates nonprice competition, and thus presumably is desired by
all industry members for increasing their profit margins, is intrig-
uing-I had not thought of it and I find it a very interesting thesis.
But I hesitate to endorse it in toto. The impact of such a change in
the securities context is quite different from the airline industry,
which Dave provides as an illustrative analogy. Namely, elimination
of the lower margin for futures will not accrue to the benefit of all
securities professionals, by lowering everyone's cost of operations
or raising everyone's profit margin. It will instead transfer wealth
from one sector, options and commodities exchanges, to another,
the stock exchange, for it reduces the demand for the formers' prod-
uct. There is also a regionalism issue here, as the sectors have dif-
ferent geographical bases, so the uniform margin requirement shifts
wealth from Chicago to New York.
If we examine the crash studies of interest groups and govern-
ment organizations, the New York-filtered explanation of the pro-
posal is confirmed: The NYSE study, as well as the study by its
regulatory authority, the SEC, endorse changing the futuresmargin
requirement in tandem with requiring physical rather than cash set-
tlements-a proposal flagrant in its effort to eliminate competition.'
But the CME study explicitly opposed a margin rule change.2 More-
over, the traders who engaged in heavy futures selling on October
19 were pension funds, trusts and other institutions that do not op-
I N. KATZENBACH, AN OVERVIEW OF PROGRAM TRADING AND ITS IMPACT ON CUR-
RENT MARKET PRACTICES (1987) (A Study Commissioned by the New York Stock Ex-
change), SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, DIVISION OF MARKET REGULATION
REPORT, THE OCTOBER 1987 MARKET BREAK (1988). The NYSE is quite sensitive to its
loss of market share in trading volume to Chicago with the advent of the S&P 500 fu-
tures contract: another proposal in the study, also supported in the SEC's study, is to
create a real security stock index to be traded at a specialist's post.
2 PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY APPOINTED BY THE CHICAGO
MERCANTILE EXCHANGE TO EXAMINE THE EVENTS SURROUNDING OCTOBER 19, 1987
(1987) (Committee members: M. Miller, J. Hawke, Jr., B. Malkiel, M. Scholes).
1989]
HeinOnline -- 74 Cornell L. Rev. 867 1988-1989
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
erate with leverage, so a higher margin requirement would not have
constrained their actions (and thus not slowed the price collapse),
3
although it will decrease the profitability of the futures exchanges.
It is not surprising that the Brady Report offers a proposal that leans
heavily for one sector of the securities industry; as a New York in-
vestment banker, Brady's priorities and sympathies would quite nat-
urally lie with the New York Stock Exchange rather than with
Chicago.
I think we can understand other proposals in the Report in this
manner as well. For instance, the proposal for a single top coordi-
nator-agency is New York rather than Chicago-oriented. No one
ever suggests letting the CFTC run the show (as it has a smaller
jurisdiction over financial instruments), and it seems safe to infer
that any proposal to centralize, indeed any proposal to unify differ-
ences across exchanges, is a way to limit or cut back the commodi-
ties exchanges' authority. As the commodities exchanges'
differences with the stock exchange have led to successful competi-
tion through product innovation, the elimination of that authority is
likely to reduce their competitiveness vis a vis the stock exchanges.
The NYSE Report's endorsement of having one agency run the
show is further supporting evidence of this explanation.
It is true that if the Brady Report had chosen the SEC rather
than the Fed as the lead agency, then the case for the Report's favor-
ing New York over Chicago would be more compelling. But such an
arrangement would also have been unseemly: a recommendation
putting the SEC in charge could have the appearance of egregious
bias, which would throw into question the "neutrality" of the entire
Report. This could well be an instance of deference to the maxim
that "you can be a pig but not a hog."
The explanation involving conflicting interests among ex-
changes that I have outlined is highly schematic. And for some of
Brady's proposals, a geographical-based schism may not exist, such
as the call for improved information systems.4 Indeed, this proposal
can clearly be given an industry group/market professional inter-
pretation: the information called for by the Report involves past
trade data, which, as Dave discusses, lends itself to policing insider
3 F. EDWARDS, POLICIES TO CURB STOCK MARKET VOLATILITY 9 (Columbia Business
School Center for the Study of Futures Markets, Working Paper No. 176) (1988).
4 This is one proposal that the CFTC study supported. FINAL REPORT ON STOCK
INDEX FUTURES AND CASH MARKET ACTIVITY DURING OCTOBER 1987 TO THE U.S. COM-
MODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, DIVISIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND OF TRAD-
ING AND MARKETS (1988) [hereinafter CFTC FINAL REPORT]. The data on individual
trades collected by the CFTC from the CBOE and CME is more specific than that col-
lected by the NYSE, and hence the CFTC partly saw this proposal as aimed more to
exchanges regulated by the SEC than those in its jurisdiction.
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trading, of particular benefit to this interest group. The information
called for by economic theory to reduce the likelihood of another
stock price collapse from dynamic hedging strategies, which is the
ostensible goal of the Report, involves, however, information onfu-
ture trading, such as the number of stop loss and other limited trade
orders (the future trading plans of informationless trading of pro-
gram traders).5 I offer the New York gloss on the Report, then, as a
means of overcoming the failure Dave finds in the special interest
group perspective largely because of apparently ambiguous features
like the Fed proposal and the industry-wide perspective he adopts.
(3) Rent Extraction Perspective. Dave's principal support for the
rent-extraction perspective is the failure of Congress to enact the
Brady Report's recommendations. There is, however, an easier,
more obvious, explanation for Congress's failure to implement the
Report. The Reagan Administration, and the Chairman of the Fed
in particular, opposed it. It is unlikely that Congress can get very far
with such a plan without White House support. There are typically
numerous items on the active policy agenda, and unless a proposal
has intense or broad support, Congress will move on to another
item that can be more consensually resolved.
A similar set of circumstances has arisen regarding the regula-
tion of takeovers, an area with which I am more familiar than stock
market regulation. The demand for additional federal legislation to
restrict hostile takeovers has been extraordinarily intense, with over
100 bills introduced over the past four years, not to mention numer-
ous hearings and Congressional reports, on the subject.6 The pub-
lic has little interest in, or knowledge about takeovers (and hence
about their beneficial effects), the business community strongly sup-
ports increased restrictions, and the individuals who are harmed by
takeover legislation are not politically organized although there are
specific groups who suffer (shareholders and bidders).7 It would ap-
pear to be a perfect situation for Congressional action. Yet no ma-
jor legislation has been forthcoming. In the takeover context, as
with the Brady Report, the Reagan Administration opposed increas-
ing regulation (as did the relevant agency head, SEC Chairman
Shad). This may not simply be a function of the Administration's
free-market ideology. As I have suggested in the takeover legisla-
tion context, there are institutional features, identified by political
scientists, that make the President more removed from pork-barrel
5 Grossman, An Analysis of the Implications for Stock and Futures Price Volatility of Pro-
gram Trading and Dynamic Hedging Strategies, 61 J. Bus. 275 (1988).
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politics. In particular, the President is elected by, and represents all
citizens, unlike members of Congress whose election is regionally
based."
There are at least two other simple reasons for inaction that cut
against a rent-extraction hypothesis. First, the geographically differ-
ential impact of the Report's proposals that I have already noted,
provides a major source of congressional inertia. The New York-
Chicago split suggests that Congress would similarly be divided in
its support for the Report, which makes enactment unlikely. This
can be observed in the internal jurisdictional conflict between the
agricultural committees that have oversight of the commodities ex-
changes and the financial and banking committees whose oversight
responsibilities include the stock exchanges.
Second, there have been voluntary reforms initiated by the pri-
vate parties and the Administration which undercut the need for
Congress to act-perhaps these substitute for the payments to legis-
lators that Dave has in mind. Examples are the trading price limits
adopted first temporarily and later permanently by the CME and
CBOE under the CFTC's supervision,9 coordinated trading halts for
all domestic markets approved by the SEC and CFTC, 10 both of
which implement the Brady Report's advocacy of "circuit breakers,"
and acceleration of plans for increasing computer facilities by the
NYSE and NASDAQ. In addition, the Reagan Administration con-
vened an interagency group of the Fed, the SEC, and the CFTC, to
coordinate the approach to the issues and problems identified by
the Report across the various markets. The adoption of these alter-
natives to the Brady proposals makes the case for enactment less
immediate as their proponents can maintain that time is necessary
to determine the alternatives' effectiveness.
These simpler and more straight-forward explanations for Con-
gressional inaction seem so persuasive to me, and not to Dave, per-
haps because I find, a priori, a rent-extraction story of legislation
unsatisfying. To begin with, I do not understand why the threat of
unpopular legislation would be credible. I suppose one problem is
that my premise is that legislators are motivated by reelection, which
requires rents to flow to constituents. It would seem unlikely that
legislators who extract rents from constituents will be reelected. If
the hypothesis then is that legislators extract rents from groups that
are not in their districts, it is even more unlikely that the legislator
will be able to enact the threatening legislation: the organization of
8 Id. at 489.
9 CFTC FINAL REPORT, supra note 4 (limits made permanent in January 1988).
10 SEC, CFTC Approve Coordinated Trading Halts in Volatile Markets, [July-Dec.] Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 41, at 1580 (Oct. 21, 1988).
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Congress provides committees with the critical power over the pro-
duction of legislation within their jurisdictional domain, and com-
mittee assignments follow a self-selective process matching
members with their constituents' interests. 1
Many additional questions can be raised concerning the credi-
bility of the threat: How are the coalitions for enactment guaran-
teed? What guarantees the President's assent? What about the
relevant agencies and their positions, must they share in the rents as
well? Why doesn't the interest group that is threatened respond by
handsomely funding the election campaigns of challengers who
promise not to engage in the practice of extraction? Are there any
instances of laws enacted because the rent went unpaid, thereby
making the threat credible, in the securities setting or any other
context?
Is the answer that in equilibrium no such laws will be passed
because the rent will always be paid to avoid extraction? (This as-
sumes the credibility of the threat without any empirical support.)
And does the answer further go that if challengers are elected, to
succeed in Congress they must consent to the extraction? Without a
formal model, it is impossible to know whether or not there are mul-
tiple equilibria, an equilibrium in which there are credible threats
and rents are extracted as Dave asserts, but also an equilibrium in
which threats cannot be credibly made and there are no extractions.
Moreover, if the rent extraction equilibrium is unique, then the
hypothesis seems even more irrefutable than Dave claims that the
interest group explanation is, for we never will see an example of a
threat carried out to evidence the credibility of threats. Further,
how can we ever identify a rent payment-if we find a PAC contribu-
tion by the NYSE to banking committee chairs, what does that
demonstrate? It could be a rent extracted to not pass legislation, or
a payment hoping that favorable legislation will be put on the
agenda or passed, or a payment for some piece of legislation previ-
ously passed, or payment to gain access in order to counteract the
influence over the legislator of a competing interest group, which is
aided by regulation. In sum, a contribution could be retrospective
or prospective, and there is no way to distinguish empirically be-
tween the possibilities. Under the New York gloss of the Report,
the symbolic act of Congress giving serious consideration to its pro-
posals may be worth a NYSE contribution, because it may lead to
voluntary action by the futures exchanges and CFTC to compromise
11 Rohde & Shepsle, Democratic Committee Assignments in the House of Representatives:
Strategic Aspects of a Social Choice Process, 67 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 889 (1973); Weingast &
Marshall, The Industrial Organization of Congress: or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Or-
ganized in Markets, 96J. POL. ECON. 132 (1988).
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with the SEC out of concern over regulation and thereby limit com-
petition in the NYSE's favor. Of course, this is a different rent-ex-
traction story, of the special interest group sort: the payments go to
competing interest groups, not solely to legislators.
When there are alternative explanations of a phenomenon that
are equally difficult to test, then, in my view, the decision rule for
choosing between them should be to invoke Occam's Razor. The
interest group story is without question the cleaner explanation.
But I also do not think that the interest group story is as untestable a
theory as does Dave. We can, at least in some cases, try to measure
ex post the wealth effects of particular pieces of legislation on differ-
ent groups. For instance, we can look at changes in product prices,
in costs where available, in market concentration, and where the
beneficiaries are publicly traded firms, in stock prices, as well as ex-
amine the express actions and reactions of the members of the af-
fected industry. If an effect cannot be identified, while that might
lead a researcher to try to find another interest group, which leads
to Dave's irrefutability charge, it might also lead the researcher to
reject the hypothesis.
Dave has provided us with a provocative account of the Brady
Report. I would urge him to voice even greater confidence in one of
the explanations he proffers, the interest group perspective. He
persuaded at least this reader.
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